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Thomas Stockmann, the protagonist of Henrik Ibsen’s play An Enemy of the 
People (1882), is an educated and civilised physician who is, among other things, 
responsible for monitoring the health standards at the baths of his home town on the 
Norwegian coast. Stockmann suspects that the thermal waters are contaminated. 
When tests verify his suspicions, he announces his intention to disclose the facts to 
the public. He is subsequently confronted by his brother Peter, the Mayor, who insists 
that revealing the poor quality of the waters would do no good and would, in fact, be 
detrimental to the livelihood of the town. As an inflexible man of principle, 
Stockmann is, however, adamant that the truth must prevail at all costs. 
 
A town meeting is called together. As he realises that the publication of his results 
are being managed and manipulated by the local press, by his brother the Mayor, as 
well as by other municipal authorities, Stockmann becomes ever more agitated about 
the narrow-mindedness of not only those who are trying to prevent him from 
disclosing the facts, but also of the general public that does not seem to share his own 
appetite for the truth. The public, so it seems to Stockmann, will settle for what is 
convenient, for ’majority truths’ that are ’like last year’s cured meat — like rancid, 
tainted ham; and they are the origin of the moral scurvy that is rampant in our 
communities’.1 And the general public’s right to take lies for the truth is supported by 
a ’doctrine’: 
 
that the public, the crowd, the masses, are the essential part of the population — 
that they constitute the People — that the common folk, the ignorant and incomplete 
element in the community, have the same right to pronounce judgment and to 
approve, to direct and to govern, as the isolated, intellectually superior personalities 
in it.2 
 
The confrontation with the town earns Stockmann his epithet as an ’enemy of the 
people’. 
 
This narrative has a more contemporary parallel, as well. 
 
                                                             
1 Henrik Ibsen, An Enemy of the People, trans. R. Farquharson Sharp (Mineola, 
NY: Dover Publications, 1999), p. 60. 
2 Ibsen, An Enemy of the People, p. 60. 
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On 3 November 2016, the High Court of Justice of England and Wales ruled in R 
(Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union3 that the notification to 
initiate the formal two-year process for the UK’s withdrawal from the European 
Union, as prescribed in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), must be 
triggered by an act of Parliament, and not by the Prime Minister under the Crown’s 
prerogative. The ruling, upheld by the Supreme Court the following year, was widely 
considered a victory for parliamentary sovereignty over cabinet executive powers.4 
 
On the day after the High Court ruling, the Daily Mail published a full page cover 
with facial portraits of each of the three justices involved in the case in court dress 
and wigs, and the words ’Enemies of the People’ were printed as the main heading 
below the portraits.5 The images and the heading suggested that these unelected 
judges represented a small privileged minority, and that their ruling undermined the 
democratic will that had been expressed by ’the People’ in the Brexit referendum. The 
power of a social elite, described further down as ’out of touch’, one judge identified 
as founding member of ’a club of lawyers and academics aiming to ”improve” EU 
law’, another as ’openly gay’ and former Olympic fencer, is set against majority rule 
by ’the People’. 
 
The juxtaposition is the same in both instances even if the narrative perspectives 
are diametrically opposite. The implied author of Ibsen’s play, that is, the 
’playwright’, celebrates the ’aristocratic heroism’ of the defiant middle-class 
individual with ’truth’ on his side,6 whereas the ’journalist’ ridiculing the High Court 
justices demands deference in the face of democratic majority rule by ’the People’. 
 
Indeed, the democratic accountability of the judiciary to the elected branches 
representing ’the People’ is usually portrayed through the restraint that the word 
’deference’ as a metaphor implies.7 In liberal democracies, the role of unelected 
justices is to apply — at most to interpret — laws that have been passed by 
                                                             
3 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 
2768 (Admin). 
4 E.g. Damian Chalmers, ’Gina Miller and the last Gasp of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty? ’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 24: 1 (2017), 
pp. 3-5. 
5 ’Enemies of the people: Fury over ”out of touch” judges who have ”declared war 
on democracy” by defying 17.4m Brexit voters and who could trigger constitutional 
crisis.’ Daily Mail, 4 November 2016. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
3903436/Enemies-people-Fury-touch-judges-defied-17-4m-Brexit-voters-trigger-
constitutional-crisis.html, accessed 4 December 2018. 
6 On Ibsen’s Nietzschean affiliations, see Ralph Leck, ’Enemy of the People: 
Simmel, Ibsen, and the Civic Legacy of Nietzschean Sociology’, The European Legacy 
10: 3 (2005), pp. 133-47. 
7 On deference broadly, see e.g. Matthew Lewans, Administrative Law and 
Judicial Deference (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016). 
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democratically elected representatives of ’the People’. The aim of this chapter is to 
question the democratic plausibility of this admittedly simplified claim. In many 
European jurisdictions, domestic courts have, for instance, taken it upon themselves 
to actively monitor the ways in which state parties comply with their positive 
obligations in ’securing Convention rights’ as per Article 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), a task that cannot, at least not without some 
reservation, be subsumed under the rubrics of mere ’application’ and 
’interpretation’.8 In this sense, the judiciary takes on ’activist’ democratic functions 
that can be said to go beyond the traditional ’deference’ paradigm.9 
 
But in discussing these democratic functions, this chapter will not adopt the usual 
focus that views the judiciary as an institution or social agent with, perhaps, a 
particular political agenda.10 Instead, it will discuss the nature of the rights that the 
courts must adjudicate on, and how the adjudication of actionable rights by necessity 
positions the judiciary into a democratic landscape that goes beyond traditional 
accounts of ’deference’ and disinterested application. This applies particularly to the 
basic and human rights that, over the last half century or so, have saturated 
practically all areas of judicial decision-making, especially in transnational contexts.11 
To make my argument, I will first clarify the position of human rights in Claude 
Lefort’s unique blend of phenomenologically and psychoanalytically inspired political 
theory. Human rights, and if my analogy is plausible, by extension all actionable 
rights, are in this account an integral element of a ’savage democracy’ that Lefort 
envisions as the only plausible political challenge to the totalitarian tendencies of 
neoliberalism. In dealing with such rights, the judiciary, so I suggest, takes on 
democratic functions that are not compatible with the much narrower notion of 
adjudication that the ’deference’ paradigm implies. 
 
From this starting point, I will then continue to discuss in more detail the position 
of the judiciary in contemporary democracies and with special reference to its role in 
a separation of powers doctrine. Standard accounts of the doctrine reduce the judicial 
powers of unelected courts to the application and interpretation of laws passed by an 
elected legislator. But as the relationship between the legislature and the executive 
branch has factually changed in contemporary democracies, so too has the 
                                                             
8 See e.g. Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (eds.), A Europe of Rights. The 
Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
9 E.g. Graham Gee, Robert Hazell, Kate Malleson, and Patrick O'Brien, The 
Politics of Judicial Independence in the UK's Changing Constitution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
10 E.g. Kate Malleson, The New Judiciary. The Effects of Expansion and Activism 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1999). 
11 E.g. Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism. The Pluralist Structure of 
Postnational Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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relative position of the judiciary. A strong executive as the engine of legislative 
initiatives, supported by the weak parliamentary scrutiny of a ’rubber-stamp’ 
legislature, has highlighted the need for a more active judiciary, a more 
democratically self-reflexive ’People’s’ judiciary, that reaches beyond the ’deferential’ 
role that standard accounts offer. 
Lefort and the body politic 
The main reason why Claude Lefort’s name comes up so often in discussions 
about politics, ranging from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s critical theory of 
the hegemony of radical democracy,12 to the post-Heideggerian analyses of Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy,13 is the distinction that he popularised 
between le politique as a form of political regime, usually translated into English as 
’the political’, and la politique or social agency conflict-ridden by opposing and often 
irreconcilable interests, usually translated simply as ’politics’.14 While many seem to 
think of the distinction was specifically introduced by Lefort, its origins in French 
political theory can be traced to Lucien Freund and Régis Debray15 through an 
emphatically philosophical reception of Max Weber.16 
 
While ’politics’ in the second apparently more conventional sense can be 
understood as the antagonist competition for power in all of its usual guises, Lefort’s 
use of the term ’the political’, in turn, refers to the way in which a given society 
represents its own unity to itself as a collectivity. It could, then, be understood as a 
form of collective identity, a representation of the body politic through which society 
identifies itself claiming to be, for example, a ’liberal democracy’. Commenting on 
Raymond Aron who is a major source of inspiration here,17 Lefort notes how the term 
                                                             
12 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2001). 
13 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, Retreating the Political, trans. 
Simon Sparks (London: Routledge, 1997). 
14 See also Martin Plot (ed), Claude Lefort: Thinker of the Political (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought. 
Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007), and Martin Breaugh, Christopher Holman, Rachel 
Magnusson, Paul Mazzocchi, and Devin Penner (eds.), Thinking Radical Democracy. 
The Return to Politics in Post-War France (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2015). 
15 See Julien Freund, L'Essence du politique (Paris: Dalloz, 2003), and Régis 
Debray, Critique of Political Reason, trans. David Macey (London: Verso, 1983). 
16 In particular Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought. Volume 
2: Durkheim, Pareto, Weber, trans. Richard Howard and Helen Weaver (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), pp. 219-346, and Julien Freund, The 
Sociology of Max Weber, trans. Mary Ilford (London: Routledge, 1998). 
17 Especially Raymond Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism, trans. Valence 
Ionescu (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968). 
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’the political’ is used in at least two ways: 
 
In a first meaning, this term designates a particular domain of the social 
ensemble; it delimits the source of authority, the conditions and means of its 
exercise, and the range of its competences. In a second meaning, the political refers 
to the social ensemble itself, for the entire collectivity is affected by conceptions of the 
nature of power and the mode of the exercise of government. … decisions made at the 
top have repercussions in all domains of social life but also … the representation of 
authority in the particular sector of politics circulates in some manner throughout the 
social ensemble. It is in this second sense that it becomes relevant to affirm a 
’primacy of the political,’ no matter the society under consideration.18 
 
So in the first meaning, ’the political’ refers to the institutional framework of a 
polity that we may call, for instance, ’liberal democracy’. This framework includes 
state ’branches’ and authorities, their legally defined competences, the regulations 
covering political participation, as well as the ’softly normative’ expectations that 
political conventions create. But in the second, more important meaning, ’the 
political’ also includes the ways in which social agents, be they institutional or 
individual, self-reflexively act in relation to each other as constituent elements of a 
particular polity. An institutional ’liberal democratic’ agent will, then, understand its 
relationship with other institutions and individuals through a certain rationale that 
usually aims at maintaining its relative position in the overall framework. 
 
Drawing on both the phenomenology of his mentor Maurice Merleau-Ponty19 and 
the psychoanalytic theory of Piera Aulagnier20, Lefort maintains that ’the political’ 
                                                             
18 Claude Lefort, ’The Political and the Social’, in Claude Lefort, Complications. 
Communism and the Dilemmas of Democracy, trans. Julian Bourg (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 113-23, at pp. 113-14. There is an echo here of 
the way in which Carl Schmitt makes a distinction between the constitution in its 
relative and absolute senses. See Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, trans. Jeffrey 
Seitzer (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), pp. 59-74. 
19 Especially the posthumous Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the 
Invisible. Followed by Working Notes, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1968). See also Bernard Flynn, The Philosophy of 
Claude Lefort. Interpreting the Political (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 2005). 
20 See Piera Aulagnier, The Violence of Interpretation. From Pictogram to 
Statement, trans. Alan Sheridan (Hove: Brunner-Routledge, 2001). Aulagnier was 
originally trained by Jacques Lacan, but later co-founded the so-called ’Fourth Group’ 
that split away from Lacan’s EFP in 1969 over disagreements concerning training 
protocols. See e.g. Cornelius Castoriadis, ’Epilegomena to a Theory of the Soul Which 
Has Been Presented as Science’, in Cornelius Castoriadis, Crossroads in the 
Labyrinth, trans. Kate Soper and Martin H. Ryle (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 
pp. 3-45. Aulagnier was at one point married to Castoriadis, Lefort’s collaborator 
from the Socialisme ou Barbarie period, 1947-1958. See Cornelius Castoriadis et al, 
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not only shapes (mise-en-forme) collective life into more or less permanent social 
relations, but that it also stages (mise-en-scène) individual interpretations of those 
relations as politics. Only these relations and their individual interpretations can 
together provide form and meaning (mise-en-sens).21 In this sense, the dimensions of 
’the political’ and ’politics’ are interwoven into one another. The antagonistic or 
conflictual element of political action, of ’politics’, is always reflected in a given 
society’s representation of itself, in ’the political’, and vice versa. Neither dimension 
can exist independently of the other. 
 
The two modern ideal-typical regimes of ’the political’ that Lefort has looked at in 
more detail, namely totalitarianism and democracy, share a kinship, but operate in 
diametrically opposite ways. In both, ’the political’ functions as a symbolic 
constitution in so far as it locates society’s unity at a particular point of power. As 
regimes, both totalitarianism and democracy are responses to the same question in so 
far as they attempt to come to terms with the empty space that has been left behind 
after the monarchy with its claim to the transcendental nature of the monarch’s 
divine power has lost its capacity to represent the corporeal unity of the body politic. 
Following the symbolic decapitation of the monarch and the consequent dissolution 
of the kingdom that she represented, power appears as an empty space. Democracy, 
Lefort emphasises, leaves that space empty. In the absence of monarchs, those who 
exercise power can henceforth only be mortals who occupy positions of power 
temporarily or who can invest themselves in it only by force or cunning. Such a fragile 
unity is unable to efface the underlying social division. For Lefort, this division 
represents the true nature of democracy as a political regime: 
 
Democracy inaugurates the experience of an ungraspable, uncontrollable society 
in which the people will be said to be sovereign, of course, but whose identity will 
constantly be open to question, whose identity will remain latent.22 
 
In other words, the antagonistic and conflictual nature of ’politics’ that keeps the 
symbolic space of power empty is what characterises ’the political’ of the democratic 
regime. In democracy, ’politics’ prevents ’the People’ from becoming a fixed sovereign 
in the monarch’s stead. 
 
Totalitarianism, on the other hand, is an attempt to fill that space, to unify society 
by placing society itself into the emptiness left behind after the regicide and the 
                                                             
Socialisme ou barbarie. Anthologie (La Bussière: Acratie, 2007). 
21 Claude Lefort, ’The Permanence of the Theologico-Political?’, in Claude Lefort, 
Democracy and Political Theory, trans. David Macey (Cambridge: Polity, 1988), pp. 
213-55, at pp. 217-21. 
22 Claude Lefort, ’The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism’, in Claude Lefort, 
The Political Forms of Modern Society. Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism, 
trans. Alan Sheridan et al (Cambridge: Polity, 1986), pp. 292-306, at pp. 303-04. 
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consequent dissolution of the body politic. With violence and repression 
totalitarianism attempts to ’weld power and society back together again, to efface all 
signs of social division, to banish the indetermination that haunts the democratic 
experience’,23 or, in other words, to suppress the ’politics’ that would maintain the 
emptiness of that space and prevent ’the People’ from coagulating into a fixed 
sovereign. 
 
Lefort’s notion of democracy also has a legal dimension. For democracy: 
 
goes beyond the limits traditionally assigned to the état de droit. It tests out rights 
which have not yet been incorporated in it, it is the theatre of a contestation, whose 
object cannot be reduced to the preservation of a tacitly established pact but which 
takes form in centres that power cannot entirely master.24 
Political rights beyond the rule of law 
In other words, Lefort’s interpretation allows us to see the judiciary as part of a 
stage on which contradictory and often irreconcilable interests are played out as 
actionable rights. So the claim does not follow the usual line of argument that begins 
with a politicised ’counter-majoritarian’ judiciary that then goes on to adjudicate on 
rights in a political way,25 but that rights themselves are by their very nature political, 
and that adjudicating on them necessarily positions the adjudicator — the judiciary — 
in a ’democratic’ way. 
 
Lefort’s rather optimistic take on the democratic potential of rights may seem 
curious bearing in mind that his background is in critical political theory. This view 
has a very particular history. French representatives of the so-called ’post-Marxist’ or 
’radical democratic’ movement would entertain a somewhat more positive view 
on the revolutionary potential of human rights than their Anglophone and German 
counterparts.26 After decades of Marxist human rights critique, the discussion in 
                                                             
23 Lefort, ’The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism’, p. 305. 
24 Claude Lefort, ’Politics and Human Rights’, in Claude Lefort, The Political 
Forms of Modern Society. Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianisn, trans. Alan 
Sheridan et al (Cambridge: Polity, 1986), pp. 239-72, at p. 258. 
25 See e.g. Scott E. Lemieux and David J. Watkins, Judicial Review and 
Contemporary Democratic Theory. Power, Domination, and the Courts (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2018), and Luís Roberto Barroso, ’Reason Without Vote: The 
Representative and Majoritarian Function of Constitutional Courts’, in Thomas 
Bustamante and Bernardo Gonçalves Fernandes (eds.), Democratizing 
Constitutional Law. Perspectives on Legal Theory and the Legitimacy of 
Constitutionalism (New York, NY: Springer, 2016), pp. 71-90. 
26 Generally, see Justine Lacroix, ’A Democracy Without a People? The "Rights of 
Man" in French Contemporary Political Thought’, Political Studies 61: 3 (2013), pp. 
676-90, Stephen W. Sawyer and Iain Stewart (eds.), In Search of the Liberal 
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France took this decisive turn in 1980 specifically with Lefort’s seminal article 
’Politics and Human Rights’.27 For Lefort, human rights — and, as I wish to suggest 
here, rights more generally — are a politics of rights equivalent to democratic politics. 
Lefort rejects the critique of the early Marx who famously declared that human rights 
’are nothing but the rights of the member of civil society, that is, of egoistic man, of 
the man who is separated from other men and from the community’.28 So Marx sees 
rights merely as a consequence of the decomposition of society into isolated monadic 
individuals. But for Lefort, even social separation is a modality of man’s relation to 
others. 
 
Views in this debate were far from uniform. A fitting counterpoint for Lefort 
would be his former student Marcel Gauchet who is, perhaps, better known for his 
historical analyses of democracy or the relationship between religion and politics.29 
Following the publication of Lefort’s article, Gauchet published his own intervention 
with the provocative title ’Human rights are not a politics’.30 Gauchet opens his essay 
with an almost scornful stab at the renewed interest in human rights in France, a stab 
                                                             
Moment. Democracy, Anti-Totalitarianism, and Intellectual Politics in France since 
1950 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), and Natalie Doyle, ’Democracy as 
Socio-Cultural Project of Individual and Collective Sovereignty: Claude Lefort, Marcel 
Gauchet and the French Debate on Modern Autonomy’, Thesis Eleven 75: 1 (2003), 
pp. 69-95. In addition to Lefort, Marcel Gauchet and Miguel Abensour discussed 
below, a fourth protagonist in this French debate would be Pierre Rosanvallon. See 
Pierre Rosanvallon, Democracy Past and Future, trans. Samuel Moyn (New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 2006), Pierre Rosanvallon, Counter-Democracy. 
Politics in an Age of Distrust, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), and Pierre Rosanvallon, ’The Test of the Political: A 
Conversation with Claude Lefort’, Constellations 19: 1 (2012), pp. 4-15. See also Wim 
Weymans, ’Freedom through Political Representation: Lefort, Gauchet and 
Rosanvallon on the Relationship between State and Society’, European Journal of 
Political Theory 4: 3 (2005), pp. 263-82, and James R. Martin, ’Pierre Rosanvallon’s 
Democratic Legitimacy and the Legacy of Antitotalitarianism in Recent French 
Thought’, Thesis Eleven 114: 1 (2013), pp. 120-33. 
27 Lefort, ’Politics and Human Rights’. 
28 Karl Marx, ’On the Jewish Question’, in Karl Marx, Marx. Early political 
writings, trans. Joseph O'Malley and Richard A. Davis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), pp. 28-56, at p. 44. 
29 Marcel Gauchet, The Disenchantment of the World. A Political History of 
Religion, trans. Oscar Burge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
30 Marcel Gauchet, ’Les droits de l’homme ne sont pas une politique’, Le Débat 3 
(1980), pp. 3-21. To my knowledge, the article has not been translated into English. 
Twenty years later Gauchet wrote a reassessment of the debate, but still just as 
critical of any positive or emancipatory potential of human rights. See Marcel 
Gauchet, ’Quand les droits de l’homme deviennent une politique’, Le Débat 110 
(2000), pp. 258-88, and Marcel Gauchet, La Révolution des droits de l'homme 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1989). See also Geneviève Souillac, Human Rights in Crisis. The 
Sacred and the Secular in Contemporary French Thought (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2005), pp. 1-50. 
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that is clearly aimed at, among others, his former teacher and friend: 
 
and so the old becomes new, what was once the very definition of something 
suspect resurfaces as something beyond all suspicion, and so our antiquated, waffly 
and hypocritical human rights regain grace, innocence and a sulphurous audacity in 
the eyes of the most subtle and exigent members of the avant-garde.31 
 
This stab reflects the rift that developed between political theorists like Lefort 
who, despite being ’post-Marxist’ in the aftermath of the hugely divisive ’choc 
Soljénitsyne’,32 still relied on Marx in his attempts at creating a social theory, and 
Gauchet who quickly became one of the key figures of the liberal left. As Samuel 
Moyn convincingly illustrates, Gauchet’s disagreement is not so much about human 
rights per se, but about the notion of individualisation.33 Apart from that, Gauchet, 
the historian, has no explicit ’theory of rights’ on the basis of which he could disagree 
with Lefort. He seems far more concerned — and quite rightly so — about the factual 
ability of human rights to promote social justice and about the willingness of the 
courts to participate in this political work. 
For Lefort, the situation is, however, quite different. He seems to be less 
interested in whether rights can successfully deliver on what they promise. His focus 
is more on the potential of an ’agonistic’ understanding of rights and what that would 
imply for democracy as an ideal-typical regime. The ’state of right’, an état de droit, 
as Lefort understands it, introduces a ’disincorporation’ of both power and right 
rather than their complete separation from each other. And so the ’state of right’ will 
always include within itself an ’opposition in terms of right’: 
 
The rights of man reduce right to a basis which, despite its name, is without 
shape, is given as interior to itself and, for this reason, eludes all power which would 
claim to take hold of it whether religious or mythical, monarchical or popular. 
Consequently, these rights go beyond any particular formulation which has been 
given of them; and this means that their formulation contains the demand for their 
reformulation, or that acquired rights are not necessarily called upon to support new 
rights.34 
                                                             
31 Gauchet, ’Les droits de l’homme ne sont pas une politique’, p. 3 (my 
translation). 
32 See e.g. Michael Scott Christofferson, French Intellectuals Against the Left. The 
Antitotalitarian Moment of the 1970's (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2004), pp. 
89-112. 
33 Samuel Moyn, ’The Politics of Individual Rights: Marcel Gauchet and Claude 
Lefort’, in Raf Geenens and Helena Rosenblatt (eds.), French Liberalism from 
Montesquieu to the Present Day (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 
291-310. 
34 Lefort, ’The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism’, p. 258. See also Claude 
Lefort, ’Human Rights and the Welfare State’, in Claude Lefort, Democracy and 




Democracy is, then, a regime in which rights are always external in relation to 
power. In such a ’savage democracy’, the law as the institution of right is, as Miguel 
Abensour, another former student and colleague, explains, no longer thought of as an 
instrument of social conservation, but as a potentially revolutionary source of 
authority for a society that constitutes itself as the indeterminate entity it is and will 
always be. In this sense, a right is always in excess of what it may have established. 
And once constituted into institutional forms, a constituent force will always 
reemerge in order to either reaffirm existing rights or to create new ones: 
 
A political stage opens according to which there is a struggle between the 
domestication of rights and its permanent destabilization-recreation via the 
integration of new rights, new demands that are henceforth considered as legitimate. 
According to Lefort, it is the existence of this incessantly reborn protest, this 
whirlwind of rights, that brings democracy beyond the traditional limits of the ’State 
of right’ [État de droit, Rechtsstaat].35 
 
The term ’savage democracy’ that Abensour accredits to Lefort is apparently a 
direct reference although the English editions available of Lefort’s work seem to bear 
little or no evidence of it.36 Abensour, however, emphasises that the ’savagery’ 
implied in the term is neither a reference to Hobbes nor to the political 
anthropologist Pierre Clastres whose seminal work on the political structures of so-
called primitive societies was a major influence for the young Lefort.37 Instead, 
                                                             
Claude Lefort, ’International Law, Human Rights, and Politics’, Qui Parle 22: 1 
(2013), pp. 117-37, and Raf Geenens, ’Democracy, Human Rights and History: 
Reading Lefort’, European Journal of Political Theory 7: 3 (2008), pp. 269-86. 
35 Miguel Abensour, ’”Savage Democracy” and the ”Principle of Anarchy”’, in 
Miguel Abensour, Democracy Against the State. Marx and the Machiavellian 
Moment, trans. Max Blechman and Martin Breaugh (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), pp. 
102-24, at p. 108 (translation modified). These French and German expressions are 
not entirely compatible with what we mean by the ’rule of law’ in English. See e.g. The 
Principle of the Rule of Law. Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe No. 1594 (2007). 
36 Justine Lacroix traces this expression to an article from 1979. See Justine 
Lacroix, ’The "Right to Have Rights" in French Political Philosophy: Conceptualising 
a Cosmopolitan Citizenship with Arendt’, Constellations 22: 1 (2015), pp. 79-90, at 
pp. 89, fn. 47. Most commentators only refer to Abensour. 
37 See Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State. Essays in Political Anthropology, 
trans. Robert Hurley (New York, NY: Zone Books, 1989), and Pierre Clastres, 
Archeology of Violence, trans. Jeanine Herman (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 
2010). See also Samuel Moyn, ’Of Savagery and Civil Society: Pierre Clastres and the 
Transformation of French Political Thought’, Modern Intellectual History 1: 1 
(2004), pp. 55-80, and Samuel Moyn, ’Savage and Modern Liberty: Marcel Gauchet 
and the Origins of New French Thought’, European Journal of Political Theory 4: 2 
(2005), pp. 164-87. 
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Abensour claims that Lefort’s democracy is ’the form of society that, through the play 
of division, leaves the field open for the question the social asks of itself ceaselessly, a 
question in perpetual want of resolution but that is here recognised as 
interminable’.38 In which case rights play a dual role both as the question being asked 
and as something that enables the asking. 
 
Although Abensour here seemingly professes allegiance to his old teacher and 
colleague, James Ingram distinguishes two features in Abensour’s own project that 
one cannot easily detect in Lefort.39 First, Abensour’s notion of democracy is built on 
a notion of popular sovereignty that is foreign to Lefort. For Lefort, ’the People’ 
cannot act as a unified collective subject in the way in which Abensour would have to 
assume because no society is able to master its own development in the way in which 
such a notion of ’the People’ suggests. Indeed, it would go against the gist of Lefort’s 
agonistic premises. This also applies to Abensour’s interpretation of how rights 
function in democracy and would undermine the ’revolutionary instrumentalism’ 
that Abensour assigns to them. 
 
Second, for Abensour, the state and its institutions are always a totalitarian threat 
to democracy, while Lefort seems to suggest that the state can advance democratic 
interests, as well. Hence his positive outlook vis-à-vis human rights. And so if the 
democratic actors of rights in Abensour’s scheme can only be representatives of ’the 
People’ set against a necessarily totalitarian state, Lefort would be more interested in 
the staging of these rights-related struggles in, for example, state-run courtrooms 
where the identity of the democratic actors is more fluid. 
An agonistic separation 
So in Lefort’s overall view, democracy is not merely the absence of an external 
authority once God has been pronounced dead. Such an absence would simply 
represent the post-theological vacuum from which both political regimes, both 
totalitarianism and democracy, follow as archetypal variations of modernity. If 
totalitarianism is the frenzied attempt to fill that empty space with unifying 
structures that would abolish the social divisions of politics, then democracy, by 
contrast, is measured by the ability of politics — as, for example, actionable rights — 
to keep that space empty. Democracy is, in other words, marked by the resistance or 
opposition against the totalitarian tendencies of modern capitalism. One name for 
that resistance is ’right’. 
 
What would the implications of Lefort’s notion of rights be for the decision-
                                                             
38 Abensour, ’”Savage Democracy” and the ”Principle of Anarchy”’, p. 105. 
39 James D. Ingram, ’The Politics of Claude Lefort's Political: Between Liberalism 
and Radical Democracy’, Thesis Eleven 87: 1 (2006), pp. 33-50, at p. 44. 
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makers that are tasked to put them into effect, that is, for the judiciary? What are the 
democratic parameters of a judiciary of ’the People’? 
 
The standard account of the position of the judiciary in a democratic environment 
is, as has been indicated earlier, framed through the notion of ’deference’. Although 
this is a mere approximation of the complex issue at hand, the task of unelected 
courts is to apply laws, issued by a democratically elected legislator, to individual 
cases. Unelected courts do not have a mandate to legislate on behalf of ’the People’. 
In principle, the independent discretion of the courts is said to be limited to 
situations where discretionary powers have either explicitly been delegated by the 
legislature, or where interpretation is needed to resolve cases in which the law 
remains ambiguous. Other than that, the courts are expected to defer any decisions 
that may seem ’political’ to the elected branches. This standard account of a ’passive’ 
or ’deferential’ judiciary — as opposed to an ’activist’ one — is dependent on a very 
specific understanding of rights as a question of law and on the assumed ability of the 
courts to tell ’questions of law’ apart from politics as per equally standard accounts of, 
for want of a better term, ’legal positivism.’ 
 
The standard account has, of course, been criticised from several different angles. 
Martin Loughlin, to take one prominent critic, claims that rights adjudication is 
intrinsically political because it requires judges to ’reach a determination on the 
relative importance of conflicting social, political and cultural interests in 
circumstances in which there is no objective — or even consensual — answer’.40 In 
this critical version of the standard account, rights represent conflicting interests, and 
resolving disputes on conflicting interests will make rights adjudication necessarily 
political, as well. So the political nature of adjudication is dependent on the 
conflictual nature of the interests represented by the rights that the courts must 
adjudicate on. 
 
The emphasis in Lefort’s notion of rights is slightly different. What is at stake is 
not so much the conflicting nature of the interests that individual rights represent, 
although this may be relevant, too. More important is the inability to fix these 
interests — any political interests — into formal law. According to the standard 
account, political interests, regardless of whether they are conflictual or not, can be 
stabilised into relatively fixed representations that can then be identified and isolated 
into ’questions of law’, that is, into clearly delimited issues that the courts have the 
privilege to adjudicate on. So, for example, as a right, the freedom of expression as 
articulated in Article 10 ECHR would constitute a relatively stable set of 
circumstances that could time and again be adjudicated on in a more or less uniform 
way. But in Lefort’s meaning, the existence and scope of such rights can always be 
                                                             
40 Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), p. 129. 
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contested with either new interpretations of the right in question or even new rights. 
 
The freedom of expression, to stick with our example, is, of course, always open to 
new interpretations that may clarify what falls under the protection of the right and 
what doesn’t. There is an abundance of Strasbourg case law on Article 10 ECHR and 
on the ’limits of acceptable criticism’ where the scope of the right is being 
continuously redrawn even if the shifts may appear small.41 The Lefortian point here 
being that this is not so much a consequence of the ’penumbral’ quality of human 
rights law more specifically, but the contestability of all rights. 
 
Moreover, the freedom of expression can in similar situations be challenged by 
entirely new rights such as, for example, a right to be protected from incitement to 
ethnic, racial or religious hatred when the exercise of the freedom of expression 
compromises such protection.42 Strictly speaking no such ’right to protection from 
the abuse of a right’, of course, exists in the ECHR framework unless one is directly 
affected as the protected ’victim’ of such hatred. But it can be construed from, for 
example, Article 17 ECHR that prohibits the use of Convention rights — the freedom 
of expression, for instance — against the core values embedded in the Convention 
itself. For Lefort, the ways in which a new right is legally construed would be of 
secondary importance. What is central is whether, to what extent, and how the 
argument made in favour of such a right is effective in the individual political 
contestation that is being staged by the judiciary. 
 
So for Lefort, the factual and individual actionability of rights trumps the fixed 
stability that their legal formalisation might suggest. Any right seemingly fixed into 
law can always be contested with either a new right or with a reinterpretation of an 
existing one. The contestable quality of all rights accounts for what Abensour called 
the ’whirlwind of rights’ that makes it impossible for the judiciary to limit itself to the 
ideal of the rule of law that the courts are thought to embody. Rights understood in 
this way always point to a regime of ’savage democracy’ that goes beyond the formal 
limits of the état de droit. And they also outline a democratic role for the judiciary 
that goes beyond standard accounts drawn from any separation of powers doctrine. 
                                                             
41 See e.g. Tarlach McGonagle in collaboration with Marie McGonagle and Ronan 
Ó Fathaigh, Freedom of Expression and Defamation. A Study of the Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, ed. Onur Andreotti (Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe, 2016). 
42 This touches upon Jeremy Waldron’s ’hate speech as harm’ argument even if 
Waldron also identifies the offended party as the ’minority groups’ that are 
specifically targeted. Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2012). Here the question is more about the limits of ’my’ 
obligation to tolerate hate speech targeted at someone else. 
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A balance of terror in a savage democracy 
This democratic role is not, I would finally argue, merely theory. The increased 
’activism’ of courts, both national and transnational, has been well documented.43 In 
the latest wave of activism, the courts themselves have not been the main agents of 
the development. Two background phenomena can be identified. 
 
First, as modern societies have brought ever new areas of human and social life 
under the regulation of legal norms, the scope of the judiciary’s decision-making 
powers has correspondingly grown.44 But even more importantly, the priority given 
to transnational instruments in national jurisdictions, especially instruments like the 
ECHR bearing relevance to basic and human rights and the corresponding 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, has transformed the face of judicial decision-making more 
or less completely.45 We have come far from the hypothetical model of a ’syllogism’ 
that the judicial profession has traditionally entertained as the ideal model of 
disinterested legal reasoning. 
 
At the same time, the political framework within which the judiciary exercises its 
powers has changed. Since September 2001, the political balance that a traditional 
tripartite separation of powers is intended to establish has changed due to increases 
in the authority of the executive.46 These changes are related to the more general 
phenomenon of ’emergency politics’.47 
 
If we understand the separation of powers48 to include an interbranch limitation 
                                                             
43 E.g. Louis Pereira Coutinho, Massimo La Torre, and Steven D. Smith, Judicial 
Activism. An Interdisciplinary Approach to the American and European 
Experiences (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), and Mark Dawson, Bruno De Witte, and 
Elise Muir (eds.), Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2013). 
44 E.g. Alec Stone Sweet, Governing With Judges. Constitutional Politics in 
Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
45 E.g. Miguel Maduro, Kaarlo Tuori, and Suvi Sankari (eds.), Transnational Law. 
Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014). 
46 E.g. John E. Owens and Riccardo Pelizzo (eds.), The 'War on Terror' and the 
Growth of Executive Power? A Comparative Analysis (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010). 
On the ’unbalanced’ European executive, see Deirdre Curtin, Executive Power of the 
European Union. Law, Practices, and the Living Constitution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
47 E.g. Bonnie Honig, Emergency Politics. Paradox, Law, Democracy (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
48 There is an abundance of literature that problematizes this admittedly 
simplified version of separated powers that I’m using here. See e.g. Christoph 
Möllers, The Three Branches. A Comparative Model of Separation of Powers 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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of the use of powers in accordance with a ’checks and balances’49 formulation, that is, 
as not merely a constitutional division of labour, but as an attempt to prevent the 
concentration of power into the hands of one government branch or another,50 then it 
is important to keep in mind that the limiting effect of the separation goes beyond 
explicit interventions like, for example, instances in which the courts have struck 
down primary legislation in judicial or constitutional review. Most research into these 
interbranch relations will focus either on the norms of competence that define the 
constitutional powers available, or the case law that represents the singular 
occurrences in which those powers have been exercised. But there is a third 
perspective somewhere between the two mentioned. The intervention implied in the 
norms of competence includes a potentiality that creates stability through mutual 
deterrence as a ’balance of terror’. The factual ability of the judiciary to intervene in 
the activities of the legislature or the executive functions as a restraint even if the 
ability suggested by the norm of competence is seldom invoked. 
 
In the contemporary political climate, the ’balance of terror’ of a traditional 
separation of powers with its ’checks and balances’ has morphed into executive-
driven forms of government where the ability of the democratically elected legislature 
to scrutinise and ’deter’ the executive has weakened. In the resulting situation, the 
relative position of the judiciary in the trias politica will have changed, too. Factual 
power positions in such separations are always relational in the sense that changes 
between two branches will always affect the third. Consequently, as the relationship 
between the executive and the legislature has changed, the judiciary will have to 
rethink its democratic role — or at least it has the opportunity to do so — and try to 
restore the balance that has been disturbed. Lefort’s agonistic definition of rights in a 
’savage democracy’ provides one theoretical framework for such a rethinking. 
 
                                                             
49 The formulation is often accredited to the ’Federalists,’ but the expression is, in 
fact, from John Adams. John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government 
of the United States of America (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1971). 
50 For this ’classical’ view, see e.g. Charles de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, The 
Spirit of the Laws, trans. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel 
Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 157. 
